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Tension between the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO:
The Significance of Recent WTO Developments
in an Ongoing Debate
Patrick J. Vallely*
On September 11, 2003, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety ("Protocol")
entered into force.' The Protocol attempts to protect biodiversity and human
health against adverse effects resulting from the handling and transfer of living
modified organisms ("LMOs").2 The Protocol defines an LMO as "any living
organism that possesses a novel combination of genetic material obtained
through the use of modern biotechnology.", 3 Continually increasing trade of

LMOs, 4 particularly in agriculture, has triggered much debate concerning the
scientific advantages and potential dangers of LMOs to humans and the
environment. LMO producers highlight the benefits of LMOs, including insect
resistance, increased production, resistance to adverse weather, and a reduced
need for pesticides.' Critics of LMOs, including many developing countries, cite
concerns of human allergic reactions to LMO crops, effects of insect-resistant
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BA 2002, University of Dayton; JD Candidate 2005, The University of Chicago.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafey (Montreal, 29 January 2000) Status of Ratification and Enty into Force,
available online at <http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/signinglist.aspx?sts=rtf&ord=dt> (visited
Mar 28, 2004). Although the United States has not signed the protocol, many key trading partners
of the United States have signed and ratified it, including the European Community, most
European nations individually, Japan, India, and Mexico, to name a few.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity art 1, available online
at <http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en.pdf> (visited Mar 28, 2004). The
term "LMOs" is basically interchangeable with "genetically modified organisms," or "GMOs" for
short. See Olivette Rivera-Torres, The Biosafety Protocol and the WTO, 26 BC Intl & Comp L Rev
263, 271 (2003).
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Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety art 3 (cited in note 2).

4

See Kirsten N. Jabara, The Biosafety Protocol, 8 U Balt J Envir L 121, 138-43 (2001) (summarizing
the increasing trade of LMOs and the roles of interested parties).
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For a fairly thorough summary of the scientific benefits and concerns surrounding LMOs, see
FITO:
The Inteplay of Culture, Science and Technology 67-75
Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the
(Kluwer 2001).
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crops on other plant life, and the general scientific uncertainty that surrounds
this new technology.6
Commentators have analyzed in depth the extent to which the Protocol
conflicts with various WTO provisions, including the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement"). The
most significant conflict between the SPS Agreement and the Protocol regards
the amount of scientific evidence of negative effects on the environment or
human health an importing state must produce to justify a trade restriction on
LMOs. The Protocol allows states to impose trade restrictions on LMOs
without scientific justification where science concerning the LMOs' safety is
uncertain.' The SPS Agreement, in contrast, requires solid scientific evidence to
justify such a trade restriction 9 and shifts the emphasis of the inquiry to trade
10
concerns.
Disputes recently decided and pending before the WTO will significantly
affect prior analyses of the conflict between treaties. A recent WTO Appellate
Body decision against Japan concerning import restrictions on apples
("Apple?')" sheds light on how the SPS Agreement interacts with trade
restrictions based on environmental concerns. Also, a pending panel dispute
addressing trade restrictions on LMOs ("Biotecb Products")12 will provide
significant guidance as to how the WTO will resolve the conflict between the
two treaties.
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Id.

7

See Rivera-Torres, 26 BC Intl & Comp L Rev at 301-15, 319-23 (cited in note 2); Fiona
Macmillan, WFTO and the Environment 177-83 (Sweet & Maxwell 2001); Aaron Cosbey and Stas
Burgiel, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafet: An Analysis of Results 12-17, available online at
<http://www.iisd.org/pdf/biosafety.pdf> (visited Mar 28, 2004); Steve Charnovitz, The
Supervision of Health and BiosafeFi Regulation by World Trade Rules, 13 Tulane Envir L J 271, 298-302
(2000); Gretchen L. Gaston and Randall S. Abate, The Biosafeoy Protocol and the World Trade
Organization:Can the Two Coexist?, 12 Pace Ind L Rev 107, 117-51 (2000); Sabrina Safrin, Treaties in
Collision? The Biosafe y Protocoland the World Trade OrganiationAgreements, 96 Am J Intl L 606 (2002).
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety art 10.6 (cited in note 2).
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Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art 2.2, available online at
<http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/15-sps.pdf> (visited Mar 28, 2004) (hereinafter
SPS Agreement).
When compared in whole, the terms of the SPS Agreement repeatedly require states to balance
trade concerns with environmental concerns, thus placing a greater emphasis on free trade. See,
for example, id art 5.3 (requiring states to consider loss of production and sales when assessing
risk); id art 5.4 (requiring states to consider objective of "minimizing negative trade effects'); id
art 5.6 (ensuring that trade restrictions "are not more trade-restrictive than required").
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Japan--MeasuresAffecting the Importation
ofApples, WTO Doc WT/DS245/AB/R (Nov 26, 2003).
World Trade Organization, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States,
European Communities-MeasuresAffecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WTO Doc
WT/DS291/23 (Aug 8, 2003).
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This Development does not examine all potential conflicts between the
treaties,' 3 but instead focuses on what these two WTO disputes mean for those
conflicts. Part I of this Development provides background on the Protocol, the
SPS Agreement, and their potential for conflict. Part II analyzes the Apples
decision and its significance for the conflict between the two treaties. Part III
examines the pending dispute before the WTO concerning a European
Community ("EC") trade moratorium on LMOs and the implications of the
dispute for the Cartagena Protocol. Finally, Part IV considers the significance of
these disputes in understanding the relationship between the two treaties.
I. THE EXISTING CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PROTOCOL AND
THE SPS AGREEMENT

The Cartagena Protocol is a product of the Convention on Biological
Diversity, a broad biodiversity agreement that came about as a result of the 1992
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro:' 4
[I]he objective of [the] Protocol is to contribute to ensuring an adequate
level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling and use of living
modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that may have
adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity, taking also into account risks15 to human health, and specifically
focusing on transboundary movements.
The Protocol attempts to meet its broad objectives by regulating the procedural
and substantive requirements under which states may impose trade restrictions
on LMOs.
The first step in the regulatory framework of the Protocol is a notification
procedure. Under this procedure, an LMO-exporting state must first notify the
importing country of its intent to export, 16 including a fairly lengthy list of details
about the LMO, its intended use, and the measures taken to protect biosafety
and human health.' 7 The importing state must then acknowledge the
9
notification 8 and proceed to engage in a risk assessment procedure. The
Protocol requires parties to conduct risk assessment "in a scientifically sound
' Annex
manner... taking into account recognized risk assessment techniques.
13

For a detailed analysis on all potential sources of conflict between the Protocol and various WTO
agreements, see Rivera-Torres, 26 BC Ind & Comp L Rev at 301-21 (cited in note 2).
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For a thorough description of the history of the Cartagena Protocol, see id at 269-73.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety art 1 (cited in note 2).
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Id art8.1.

17

Id at annex I.

18

Id art 9.1.

19

Id arts 10, 15.

20

Idart 15.
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III of the Protocol provides a rough outline of the risk assessment procedure,2'
but ambiguity provides states with opportunities to establish procedures that
meet their own subjective ends. Following a risk assessment, the importing state
may decide to allow importation of the LMO, to prohibit import altogether, or
to allow the import on certain conditions.22
The most controversial language in the Protocol relevant here is Article
10.6, which incorporates what is known as a "precautionary principle." It states:
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific information
and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of a
living modified organism on the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity in the Party of import, taking also into account risks to
human health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a decision, as
appropriate, with regard to the import of the living modified organism in
question... , in order to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects.2 3
This provision is controversial because it seemingly allows a country to restrict
trade even in the absence of scientific justification. Some commentators even
suggest that this clause of the Protocol permits a state to adopt a "zero tolerance
policy," restricting import of all LMOs."4
The preambular language of the SPS Agreement demonstrates goals
different than the Protocol. While the SPS Agreement recognizes that states
should not "be prevented from adopting or enforcing measures necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health," sounding somewhat like the
Protocol, the SPS also concerns itself with "negative effects on trade" and
"access to markets."2 5 In other words, the SPS balances environmental concerns
against free trade concerns, while the Protocol's emphasis is purely
environmental. Interpretations of the SPS Agreement reject trade restrictions
based on purely local perceptions of what is safe, displacing national attitudes
with science-based rules.26
The SPS Agreement's relative emphasis on trade is reflected heavily in its
risk assessment provisions. Appellate Body decisions hold that a party must
show probability, not just possibility, of risk to the environment or human
health. In addition to various scientific factors, the SPS Agreement requires
21

Id at annex III.

22

Id art 10.3.

23

Id art 10.6.

24

See, for example, Macmillan, WTO and the Environment at 180 (cited in note 7).

25

SPS Agreement at preamble (cited in note 9).

26

Echols, Food Safety and the WITO at 3 (cited in note 5).

27

Joost Pauwelyn, Applying SPS in WTO Disputes, in David Robertson and Aynsley Kellow, eds,

Globalization and the Environment: Risk Assessment and the WhTO 63, 66 (Edward Elgar 2001)
(summarizing WTO case law and concluding that it is not sufficient for a risk assessment to show
only possibility of entry of disease--a party must evaluate the probability of such an entry).
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countries to consider "potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales
in the event of the entry," the "relative cost-effectiveness of alternative
approaches to limiting risks," and the avoidance of a "disguised restriction on
international trade. ' 21 Where a risk justifies regulation of trade, states are
instructed not to impose a measure "more trade-restrictive than required" to
meet the ends of the regulation.2 9 Most importantly with respect to conflict with
the Protocol, the SPS Agreement requires that states base trade-restricting
measures on "scientific principles" and orders states not to maintain measures
"without sufficient scientific evidence. '
The most obvious conflict between the treaties is between the Protocol's
precautionary principle and the SPS Agreement's requirement of "sufficient"
evidence. The Protocol appears to set forth a much lower standard, which may
allow states to reject importation of LMOs without any scientific evidence
whatsoever, where relevant scientific data is lacking. Although the SPS
3
Agreement contains its own precautionary principle, ' WTO decisions have
repeatedly weakened its significance, leading commentators to characterize the
3
SPS Agreement's precautionary principle as eviscerated. ' The WTO Appellate
Body found that a precautionary principle "has not been written into the SPS
Agreement as a ground for justifying SPS measures that are otherwise
inconsistent with the obligations of Members .... "3 Also, the Appellate Body
3
found that if any of the four requirements " for invoking the SPS Agreement's
35
precautionary principle are not met, then the trade restriction is unwarranted.
Furthermore, while the SPS Agreement requires states enacting temporary
measures without scientific evidence to search for additional scientific evidence
3a
justifying the restriction "within a reasonable period of time," the Protocol
establishes no such ongoing duty to discover evidence.
28

SPS Agreement arts 5.3, 5.5 (cited in note 9).

29

Id art 5.6.

30

Id art 2.2 (emphasis added).

31

Id art 5.7.

32

James Cameron, The Precautionay Principle, in Gary P. Sampson and W. Bradnee Chambers, eds,
Trade, Environment, and the Millennium 287, 311-12 (UN University 2d ed 2002).
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, EC-Measures concerningMeat and Meat
Products (Hormones) 124, WTO Doc WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan 16, 1998).

33
34

35

36

The four requirements are (1) where available scientific information is not sufficient, (2) measures
are adopted on the basis of relevant information, (3) the state restricting trade attempts to obtain
information necessary for further risk assessment, and (4) the measure is reviewed in a reasonable
period of time. Pauwelyn, Applying SPS in WITO Diputes at 69 (cited in note 27).
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Japan--MeasuresAffecting Agricultural
Products191, WTO Doc WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb 22, 1999) (finding there was no need to examine
the requirements of the first sentence of Article 5.7 because the requirements of the second
sentence were not met).
SPS Agreement art 5.7 (cited in note 9).

Summer 2004

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

Some commentators find no necessary conflict, asserting that a state
restricting trade under the Protocol must also meet the standards of the SPS
Agreement or that the two agreements are consistent.3 7 However, this
conclusion relies on the assumption that both agreements function to limit a
state's power to restrict trade, which is not necessarily the case. The Protocol, in
many respects, appears to be a grant of power-asserting that states may take
certain measures to protect biodiversity and human health. If this is true, then
the Protocol appears to grant power to states that the SPS Agreement denies.
Also, the fact that numerous commentators have extensively analyzed the
potential for conflict between the two treaties illustrates that such a conflict is
not a moot issue.
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE APPLES DISPUTE
The dispute in the Apples case involves Japanese policies related to the
protection of its domestic apple crops from a bacterium known as "fire blight."
The "fire blight" bacterium originated in North America and later spread to
Europe and parts of the Mediterranean, but has not yet affected Latin America,
Africa, or most of Asia.38 Japan imposed burdensome restrictions on the
importation of United States apples, prompting the United States' claim that
39
Japan was in violation of the SPS Agreement.
The WTO Appellate Body made important conclusions relevant to the
treaty conflict here at issue. Japan argued that given the lack of current scientific
knowledge concerning the bacterium's pathway and method of transmission, the
lower Panel (which found against Japan) should have accorded more deference
to Japan's risk assessment. 40 The Appellate Body rejected this argument,
upholding the Panel's conclusion that the measure was "clearly disproportionate
to the risk identified on the basis of the scientific evidence available.",41
According to the Appellate Body, "total deference to the findings of the national
authorities would not ensure" the objective assessment required by the SPS
Agreement.42 Consequently, the Appellate Body found Japan in violation of

37

38

39
40

41

See, for example, Cosbey and Burgiel, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafeoy (cited in note 7);
Charnovitz, 13 Tulane Envir L J at 300 (cited in note 7); Safrin, 96 Am J Intl L at 628 (cited in
note 7).
World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, Japan-MeasuresAffecting the Importaion of Apples
7 2.1-2.6, WTO Doc WT/DS245/R (July 15, 2003).
Id 3.1.
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Japan-MeasuresAffecing the Importation
of Apples 161 (Nov 26, 2003) (cited in note 11).
Id 163, quoting World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, Japan--MeasuresAffecting the
Importation of Apples

42

Id

2.1-2.6 (July 15, 2003) (cited in note 38).

165.
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Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement as the measure in question was imposed
without sufficient scientific evidence 4 3 In coming to this conclusion, the
Appellate Body determined that Japan's risk assessment procedure failed to
establish a causal relationship between the imposition of the trade restriction and
the prevention of the bacterium's introduction. Specifically, risk assessment
should not merely consider the possible adverse effects, but "must connect the
possibility of adverse affects with an antecedent or cause.""
Another significant aspect of the Apples decision was the Appellate Body's
exposition on burdens of proof. Japan argued that the United States, as the
exporter of a disease, had more information regarding the, bacterium, and that
therefore, the burden of scientific proof should be on the United States to prove
the safety of their exports.45 Japan further argued that the United States should
be required to prove affirmatively the insufficiency of scientific evidence
underlying Japan's measures. 46 The Panel rejected these suggestions,
emphatically asserting that "the burden is on Japan, as the party invoking Article
47
'
5.7 to make a prima facie case in support of its position. The Appellate Body
upheld the Panel's conclusions, holding that although the complaining party has
the burden of establishing a prima facie case of conflict with the SPS Agreement,
in response. ' 4 1
the responding party "must prove the case it seeks to make
This case is significant to the future of the Cartagena Protocol in a couple
of ways. First, the Appellate Body reinforced the WTO's consistent rejection of
measures asserted to protect the health of plants and animals under the SPS
Agreement and rejected Japan's request for deference to its scientific risk
assessment. This trend demonstrates a general hostility by the WTO to
environmental claims of ambiguous scientific validity. It also stands in conflict to
the Protocol's precautionary principle, which gives much deference to
environmental concerns of individual states. The Panel's focus on Japan's
"disproportionate" actions, upheld by the Appellate Body, is also significant.
The Protocol has no such proportionality requirement, creating further conflict
between the treaties. Assuming future WTO decisions follow the logic in the
Apples case, the deference and latitude the Protocol affords to states restricting
trade will be meaningless.
43

Id T 168.

44

Id 1202, n 372.

45

World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, Japan-MeasuresAffecting the Importation of Apples
TT 7.2-7.5, 8.44 (July 15, 2003) (cited in note 38).
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Japan-MeasuresAffecting the Importation
of Apples $$ 149-50 (Nov 26, 2003) (cited in note 11).

46
47
48

World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, Japan-MeasuresAffecting the Importation of Apples
8.212 (July 15, 2003) (cited in note 38).
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Japan-MeasuresAffecting the Importation
ofApples TT 153-54 (Nov 26, 2003) (cited in note 11).
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The burden of proof issue analyzed in the Apples case is also important.
The precautionary principle contained in Article 10 of the Protocol suggests a
great amount of deference to the state imposing restrictions on trade in
justifying the restriction. When combined with the detailed notification
requirements imposed on exporters, the Protocol appears to impose a burden on
the exporting country to demonstrate the safety of a given LMO export. The
actual evidentiary burdens imposed on parties in a dispute under the Protocol
are not yet known, as the Protocol defers agreement on specific procedural
issues to a later date,49 but the text implies that the burden lies with the exporter.
This directly conflicts with the assertion in Apples that the burden lies on the
trade-restricting country to prove its side of the argument, further complicating
reconciliation of the two treaties. Such an allocation of burdens, as a procedural
matter, will significantly weaken the protections afforded trade-restricting states
under the Protocol.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PENDING BIOTECH
PRODUCTS DISPUTE
Ambiguity exists as to what would happen in a dispute involving both
treaties. To which body would the parties turn? Which body would more likely
seize the case? What result? Although this conflict may be distant, a pending
case before a WTO Panel will shed light on how the WTO's SPS Agreement
jurisprudence applies to LMOs.
On August 7, 2003, the United States requested the establishment of a
Panel to examine measures taken by the EC concerning LMOs.5 ° The United
States complains of a moratorium imposed by the EC on all such products,
under which the EC has suspended consideration for applications to import
such products into the EC. The result of this moratorium has been the exclusion
of United States LMO products from the EC's market. The United States also
complains of national policies imposed by EC member states having similar
effects on LMO imports and alleges that such restrictions violate the SPS
Agreement. This dispute is the first in the \XTO concerning LMOs.
This dispute will help answer a number of preliminary questions about the
conflict between the Protocol and the SPS Agreement. One question is how a
WTO panel will evaluate scientific evidence concerning LMOs. The WTO, in
other disputes under the SPS Agreement, has generally found scientific evidence
49
50

See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety art 27 (cited in note 2).
World Trade Organization, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States,
European Communities-MeasuresAffecting the Approval andMarketing of Biotech Products (cited in note
12). The United States uses the term "products of agricultural biotechnology" in the dispute,
which describes products included in the Protocol's definition of "LMOs." See Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety art 3 (cited in note 2).
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and risk assessment procedures lacking, thus rejecting importing states' attempts
at restricting the inflow of certain goods.5' However, LMOs present unique
issues not addressed in prior SPS disputes, including the recent emergence of
bioengineering technology, the tremendous amount of public concern associated
with their safety, and the uncertainty of scientific evidence justifying or
mitigating such public concern. Regardless of the outcome, this dispute will have
significant ramifications for the trade of LMOs generally.
The implications for the Cartagena Protocol are unclear, given the
immaturity of this dispute. If the WTO rejects a science-based justification for
the moratorium which appears to be permissible under the Protocol's
precautionary principle, then the collision between the Protocol and the SPS
Agreement will become more imminent. If the WTO accepts the EC's science,
focusing on the gravity of the alleged threat of LMOs, room for harmony
between the two treaties will expand. Additionally, if the WTO reemphasizes the
importing country's burden to demonstrate harm and causation before
restricting import, it will foreshadow future conflicts between the burdens of
proof of the two agreements, given the Protocol's apparent placement of burden
on the exporting state. Given the overlap in issues between the Biotech Products
case and the conflict of treaties discussed in this Development, this case will
provide us with guidance as to whether
the WTO will permit the Protocol's
52
law.
international
as
language to survive
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the bulk of commentators conclude that conflict between the
SPS Agreement and the Protocol is either non-existent or insignificant, 3 the
Apples decision and the Biotech Products case (if the panel there follows the same

51

52

53

See, for example, World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, Japan-Measures
Affecling AgriculturalProducts 85 (Feb 22, 1999) (cited in note 35) (upholding Panel's finding of
violation of Article 2.2 on some products where the importing country lacked sufficient scientific
evidence to maintain a trade restriction); World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate
135-38, WTO Doc WT/DS18/AB/R
Body, Australia-MeasuresAffecting Importation of Salmon
(Oct 20, 1998) (upholding Panel's finding that the importing country failed to conduct a proper
risk assessment while maintaining trade restrictions, thus violating Articles 5.1 and 2.2 of the SPS
Agreement).
Exactly how a conflict between the two treaties would play out in actuality implicates complex
issues of international law that are beyond the scope of this paper. Needless to say, interested
parties would have clashing views as to which treaty's language should prevail. For an example of
a discussion on how a conflict may be resolved, see Safrin, 96 Am J Ind L at 622-27 (cited in note
7).
See, for example, Cosbey and Burgiel, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafey (cited in note 7);
Charnovitz, 13 Tulane Envir L J at 300 (cited in note 7); Safrin, 96 Am J Intl L at 628 (cited in
note 7).
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trend as in the Apples panel) make such a conflict much more likely. The conflict
between the two treaties may be resolved by state practice or by an authoritative
decision from the WTO, but states are likely to have differing views on the
relationship between the two treaties, given their differing interests and goals.
The existing scholarly debate and recent developments in the WTO reveal the
existence of, at minimum, a political conflict. If the WTO continues on its
current path, the peaceful coexistence of these two treaties will almost surely
end.
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